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Abstract 
The analysis of cost externalities in the evaluation of road pricing schemes based upon a 
network analysis in Christchurch (New Zealand) is presented. Results indicate that current 
practices do not suit the special characteristics of road pricing analysis and evaluation. Road 
charging may create negative benefits for society and its main purpose (increasing 
transportation efficiency) may not reached as well. 
 
1. Introduction 
The prospects of implementing road pricing schemes in urban areas have attracted a great deal 
of attention in recent years. Reports of the Singapore and London experiences have 
encouraged many transportation planning agencies to examine the prospects of road pricing 
implementation (Transport for London, 2003). Based on the results of these experiences, it 
has been argued that road pricing constitutes a planning instrument, which can be used to 
reach transportation planning objectives, because it directly affects road user behaviour. On 
the other hand, concerns have been expressed about the long-tem impacts and reliability of 
road pricing project evaluations. 
 
In the scientific literature, recent road pricing modelling efforts can be classified as theoretical 
or practical studies. On the theoretical side, studies such as Yan and Lam (1996), Yang and 
Huang (1998), de Palma et al (2005), Yperman et al (2005), Meng et al (2005) and Zhang and 
Levinson (2005) have concentrated in analysing marginal cost charging either for first best 
road pricing (general network) or second and third best charging schemes (bridges, tunnels, 
motorways, etc) considering hypothetical road networks. On the other hand, various practical 
pricing case studies such as Gupta et al (2005), May and Milne (2005), Sapirova (2005) and 
Sumalee et al (2005) has mostly contemplated valuation and assessment of travel time, travel 
cost and travel distance benefits associated with charging schemes by applying a large variety 
of optimisation techniques (e.g.: genetic algorithms, game theory, etc).  
 
Although there are several practical motivations and considerable scientific progress has been 
achieved, the implications of cost externalities associated with travel demand behavior 
modelling have still to be examined in details. Current  project evaluation practices estimate 
the benefits mainly from the minimization or the reduction of the network-wide travel time, 
which is obtained through the estimation of traffic flows on the network (Meyer and Miller, 
1994). For the evaluation of road pricing schemes, it is assumed that the road network can be 
controlled in order to reach the best use of the road capacity, through charging the marginal 
cost in order to minimise the road system travel time (cost). However, it is essential to verify 
whether economic efficiency is reached through the minimization of the system travel time. 
This specifically implies that the traffic assignment modelling and forecasting results have to 
be examined for  the special case of road  pricing schemes.  It is also  important  to expand the 
 
analysis to incorporate the social impacts generated by road pricing schemes. The 
consideration of external costs that are not currently part of the analysis may affect the results 
of the evaluation of road pricing schemes. 
 
This paper presents the analysis of cost externalities in the evaluation of road pricing schemes 
based upon network analysis. After this brief introduction, we examine the state-of-the art 
network modelling concepts in order to assess the impact of cost externalities in road pricing 
evaluation. An application of these modelling concepts to a case study in Christchurch, is 
described. Conclusions are summarized in the final section.  
 
 
2. Modelling cost externalities impacts in road pricing evaluation 
This section presents the main modelling definitions, assumptions and procedures as well as 
the formulation of cost functions to analyse the impacts of cost externalities in the evaluation 
of road pricing.  
 
2.1. Modelling definitions 
To conduct the modelling of network users’ behaviour under road charging conditions, two 
distinct principles are enunciated:  
- All users make their route choices in order to minimise their perceived travel time 
(cost) up to a point of equilibrium at which the travel time (cost) on all used routes is 
less than or equal to that on the unused routes (i.e. Wardrop’s first principle), which 
can be expressed mathematically as an optimization problem as: 
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Where 
eT =  total network cost at the point of equilibrium e; 
pqrh =  traffic flow from origin p to destination q on the route r; ( )aa fc = travel cost on the link a for a  flow fa 
pqd =  demand for trips from origin p to destination q; 
a
pqrδ =  1 (if the link a is on the route r from p to q) or 0 (otherwise); 
L=  set of links in the network; 
P=  set of origin nodes; 
Q=   set of destination nodes; and 
A=  set of links as part of route; 
- With control of the road network, the best use of road capacity is reached through 
charging the marginal cost in order to minimise the system total cost (i.e. Wardrop’s 
second principle). This can be expressed mathematically as:  
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Subject to conditions expressed in equations 1a and 1b, where: 
(1)
(1a)
(1b)
(2)
OT =  Total network cost at the point of system equilibrium O; 
( )ama fc = marginal travel cost on the link a for a flow fa; 
On one hand, Equation 1 expresses the current practice adopted in project evaluation, which 
considers the minimization of travel costs to estimate benefits. On the other hand, Equation 2 
supports Bell and Iida’s (1997) observation that road pricing is the mechanism for applying 
marginal charges that are the difference between marginal and average costs. Furthermore, the 
economic theory suggests that the most efficient allocation of resources results when 
travellers pay the marginal cost inclusive of the externalities.  
 
 
2.2. Modelling assumptions  
The main assumption adopted here is that users can be charged in terms of their direct usage 
of the road network and/or in terms of indirect costs such as noise, air pollution and accidents. 
This assumption is ambitious in nature and maybe unrealistic to a certain degree, because its 
implementation would be almost impossible using the technology and knowledge currently 
available. Nevertheless, it relates to reality to the extent that direct and indirect impacts occur 
every time a road user makes a trip, but they are not actually accountable for the impacts of 
their actions.  
 
2.3. Modelling procedure 
This comprises four steps. Firstly, relevant data about both supply and demand are prepared 
for analysis. For simplicity the demand (i.e. origin-destination or OD flows) is assumed to be 
fixed within the study network. On the supply side, physical network characteristics, such as 
free flow speeds and link capacities, have to be defined a priori.  
 
The second step involves the selection of the appropriate cost functions and assignment 
methods, in order to establish the interaction between supply and demand. Two descriptive 
types of cost functions are employed: perceived cost and social cost. In transportation practice 
and research, perceived cost is often represented by travel time only, due to its simplicity and 
major contribution to the total perceived cost. The Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) travel time 
function is the best known and mostly commonly applied in transportation studies (Thomas, 
1991). On the other hand, social cost consists of three aspects: efficiency, energy and 
environment effects. In the social cost function, total travel time represents the economic 
efficiency of transportation system and total fuel consumption represents energy sustainability, 
while accidents, pollution and noise costs take account of environmental sustainability. 
 
Among assignment methods, user equilibrium (UE) assignment with the classic BPR cost 
function is initially used to estimate the unregulated traffic pattern. Then road pricing is 
assumed to be implemented throughout the network by charging users the marginal cost, 
which Bell and Iida (1997) defined as the user optimum (UO), because the minimum travel 
cost (time) is achieved from the users’ point of view. From the public perspective, the social 
optimum (SO) is estimated by minimising the total social cost. The social equilibrium (SE) 
assignment approach (where users are assumed to minimise the perceived social costs of their 
own travel) is used merely for comparison purposes. 
 
In the fourth step, the assignment types are established on the basis of the combinations of 
cost functions and traffic assignment methods, as shown in Table 1. It can be seen from the 
last column of Table 1 that all the assignments are conducted using the UE approach, since it 
has been mathematically proven that the system optimum assignment can be identified 
through user equilibrium assignment with marginal costs (Newell, 1980; Mao, 2004). For 
example, the SO assignment involves the optimal allocation of traffic based on the social cost, 
and can be accomplished by the UE assignment method with marginal social costs. Based on 
the UO traffic assignment, the implementation of a road pricing scheme is simulated. For all 
assignment types (UE, UO, SO and SE), the total travel time value and social cost are 
calculated and compared. The total travel time values indicate whether the road pricing is 
efficient in monetary terms, while the social cost is used to examine whether it creates 
benefits to the society. This will also be used to verify the impact of the cost externalities in 
the assessment of road pricing schemes. 
 
Table 1 – Assignment definitions 
Assignment type Description Accomplished by UE 
with 
UE minimising users’ perceived costs (time) perceived costs 
UO minimising total user travel cost (time) marginal costs 
SE minimising users’ social costs social costs 
SO minimising total social cost marginal social costs 
 
 
 
2.4. Formulation of cost functions 
User costs differ from the user perceived costs, which are often represented by time cost 
functions or generalised cost function. Instead the economic values of time and fuel 
consumption can be calculated dynamically according to average travel speeds on individual 
links.  
 
The list of external costs, however, is almost endless. For instance there are twelve 
components in environmental assessment recommended by HMSO (1993) in the UK, namely 
air quality, cultural heritage, disruption due to construction, ecology and nature conservation, 
landscape effects, vehicle travellers, water quality and drainage, geology and soils, and policy 
and plans. Since it is impossible to consider them all, some major components should be 
taken into account, which are costs of accidents; road construction, maintenance and services; 
and environmental externalities such as air pollution and noise (Small, 1992). 
 
Taking into consideration Transfund NZ’s Project Evaluation Manual (PEM) (Transfund 
2002), the following sub-sections describe the cost functions for user’s perceived cost, social 
cost and marginal costs.  
 
2.4.1. Perceived cost 
The classic BPR cost function is shown in Equation 1, where the free flow time is t0, and the 
link flow is f and the link capacity is C. The parameters α and β are estimated to fit the 
relationship to the observed traffic flow characteristics in the absence of road pricing. 
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2.4.2. Social cost 
Social cost (SC) is the summation of the travel time cost (TTC), operating cost (OC), accident 
cost (AC), air pollution cost (APC) and noise cost (NC) in monetary terms (NZ$), as 
represented in Equation 4. 
NCAPCACOCTTCSC ++++=  
 
The travel time cost is defined by Transfund (2002) as the base value of travel time in un-
congested conditions ($16.27/vehicle/hour) plus the additional value of travel time due to 
congestion ($3.95/vehicle/hour). Therefore, after applying these two values to Equation 3, the 
travel time cost of a vehicle on a link is 
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As for the vehicle operating cost on a link, Transfund’s Manual (2002) recommends the 
application of Equation 6. 
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where 
L  link length (km); 
v  travel speed (km/hour) on a link; and 
vc  minimum value in the range ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
C
f;0.1 . 
 
For the third component (accident cost), the average cost for vehicles travelling on a link is 
estimated using the following equation. 
AC Lf ⋅⋅= 08.003.0         
 
The air pollution cost is the most imprecise one among the social costs, with Transfund 
(2002) suggesting that a light vehicle travelling at 40 km/hour has an air pollution cost of 1 
cent per km. It is not unreasonable to assume the average speed is 40 km/hour in the peak 
hour given that traffic in the network is slightly congested. Hence, the air pollution cost of a 
vehicle on a link is calculated as follows. 
l⋅= 01.0APC  
where l  is the length of the link. 
 
As for the last component of social cost, the average noise cost per vehicle per hour on a link 
is calculated as shown in Equation 9, assuming that the ambient noise level is 55 dB network-
wide (HMSO 1975) and the monetary value for a link is determined according to Transfund 
(2002). 
fNH
v
vQNC T /7.98
500400log33log100217.0 1010 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++=  
where 
NH is the number of households along the link; and  
QT is the daily traffic volume (AADT, vehicles per 18 hours a day). 
2.4.3. Marginal costs 
On the basis of Equation 3, the marginal cost is as follows. 
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The marginal social cost can be derived from the social cost and the derivation is not 
presented here due to the limited space (see Mao, 2004 for details). 
 
 
3. Case study 
This section describes the application of the concepts presented in section 2 to conduct 
network analysis experiments that aim to assess the impact of cost externalities in the 
evaluation of a road pricing scheme in Christchurch, New Zealand.  
 
The following sub-sections describe the study area, the database, modelling results and 
analysis.  
 
3.1 Description of the study area and the database 
The study area comprises the Greater Christchurch Metropolitan area, which gathers an 
approximately 350 thousand inhabitants of 130,500 households with approximately 200,000 
cars. The area is covered by an extensive network, which includes main arterial roads such as 
the Main North Road, Main South Road, Riccarton Road, Blenheim Road, Colombo Street, 
QE II Drive, Southern Motorway and Northern Motorway. Figure 1 shows the study area and 
its main urban elements.  
 
Previous planning and modelling activities (e.g. Christchurch Transportation Study - CTS) 
have divided the study area into 559 zones, including 10 external zones, and reserving 81 
zones for the future usage. Figures 2 and 3 show, respectively, the zones and the network used 
in this study. The network data was obtained from the Traffic Model (1996) developed jointly 
by the Christchurch City Council, Environment Canterbury and Transit New Zealand. and 
consists of basically residential zones. The road network database (road lengths, capacity, 
travel time, etc) was obtained from the Christchurch City Council and was geo-referenced in a 
Geographical Information System (GIS) according to the New Zealand Map Grid.  
 
This study considered an Origin-Destination matrix comprising 471 traffic zones, 
representing a total demand of 88115 trips in the morning peak (8-9 AM).  
 
(10) 
Figure 1 – Main elements of the study area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Traffic zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Road Network 
 
3.2. Modelling results  
The cost functions (Equations 4-10) were implemented in a Transportation Planning package 
(TransCAD) in order to conduct the four assignments (UE, UO, SE and SO) as defined in 
Table 1.  
 
Initially, the UE assignment with the BPR cost function (Equation 3) was used to reproduce 
the current traffic flow pattern. After 8 iterations considering a convergence rate of 0.01, 
constantsα andβ  in the BPR function were calibrated (Equation 11). For a relative gap of 
0.01, equilibrium was reached for an observed Root Mean Square Error (RMSE, defined in 
equation 12) of 34.16 trips with maximum flow change of 349.82 trips. The total number of 
vehicle*hours was 776845.51 and the total number of vehicle*Km was 649366.224. The 
assigned volume/capacity (VOC) ratios are shown in Figure 4. 
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The four assignments (UE, UO, SE and SO) were carried out for the current network 
configuration, and the total travel times, travel time costs and social costs are listed in Table 2 
and graphically represented in Figure 5. 
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where  
fe   estimated traffic flow; and 
n  number of links with observed traffic flow f;  
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 Figure 4 – Reproduced VOC 
 
Table 2 – The results of the four assignments 
 Assignment 
 UE UO SE SO 
Total travel time (veh-min) 
(% increase from UE) 
692,113 
(NA) 
669,982 
(-3.2) 
735,366 
(6.2) 
684,850 
(-1.0) 
Total Social Cost (NZ$) 
(% increase from UE) 
305,646 
(NA) 
304,351 
(-0.4) 
307,080 
(0.5) 
302,994 
(-0.9) 
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Figure 5 – Traffic Assignment results: (a) Network Travel Time; (b) Network Social Cost 
It can be seen that system-wide road pricing (UO) results in the minimum total travel time 
(692,113 vehicles-minutes). Its benefit results from the travel time saving of 22,131veh-min 
when compared with the assumed current travel pattern (UE). The SE assignment gives the 
largest travel time (approximately 6.2% more than the UE result), which is mostly due to the 
incorporation of external factors (accident, noise and pollution) into the cost functions The SO 
assignment does decrease the total travel time but not as much as for the UO assignment. 
 
As for the total social cost, the SO assignment provides the lowest social cost for the system 
(NZ$302,994). The highest value occurs for the SE assignment, which is approximately 0.5% 
more than the UE results. Also interesting to note the composition of the social costs; this is 
approximately the same proportion of costs for all four types of assignments (travel time 
cost=56%; vehicle operational cost=31%; accidents costs=9%; air pollution costs=2%; noise 
costs=2%) 
 
3.3. Analysis of the results 
The results described in section 3.2 indicate that there is a clear relationship between network 
performance measures (total travel time cost and total social cost) and the four types of traffic 
assignment (UE, UO, SE and SO) reflecting different road pricing schemes. For each network 
performance measure, the results are different for each traffic assignment (UE, UO, SO and 
SE). For instance, the network performance results considering travel time show that the 
performance will be best with the introduction of a road pricing scheme (UO assignment). 
Furthermore, using the total social cost as the performance measure leads to the conclusion 
that a road pricing scheme (UO), which excludes social costs, would not be the best possible 
policy available 
 
Consequently, it appears that totally different decisions will be reached depending on which 
traffic assignment and performance measures are employed. This is particularly interesting, 
because the outcomes present a great deal of contradiction among themselves. Current 
practices of evaluation, which convert travel time costs after traffic assignment, may lead to a 
decision that at the same time disregard the economic feasibility and the social impacts. As 
shown in Figure 6, the contradiction between the selection of the total travel time and total 
social costs is obvious, because if one takes the total travel time axis as the reference for 
comparison, the User Optimum (UO) is clearly the best option. However, if the total social 
cost axis is taken, then UO is actually far from the best option (SO). In contrast, the Social 
Optimum (SO) minimizes the adverse impacts, because it simultaneously optimizes the traffic 
pattern while accounting for the external costs. On the other hand, the Social Equilibrium 
(SE) option is extremely inefficient, because it allows road users to make their route choice 
decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
660 680 700 720 740
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
ThousandsTotal Travel Time (veh-mins)
To
ta
l S
oc
ia
l C
os
t (
$)
UE UO SE SO
Figure 6 – Traffic Assignment results: Network Travel Time versus Network Social Cost
4. Conclusions 
This paper attempts to contribute to the scientific and technical discussion regarding the 
analysis and evaluation of road pricing schemes. Among the many issues related to the 
implementation of road pricing schemes that have been discussed, the analysis and evaluation 
has a critical role in measuring, quantifying and comparing the benefits, costs and impacts 
that may be created from the implementation of road pricing. In this paper, we discussed the 
reliability of current practices for road pricing analysis evaluation, based on a method that 
provides a comparative analysis of the benefits and costs associated with interventional and 
non-interventional policies, as well as the incorporation of broad social impacts.  
 
It was found that the application of current practices does not suit the special characteristics of 
road pricing analysis and evaluation. Current practices concentrate on the minimization of 
travel time, which is contradictory to the nature of road pricing schemes, which are heavily 
based on charging users the marginal travel costs. 
 
The main consequence of this assessment of current practices is that technical decisions may 
be made based on erroneous grounds. In the case study, the road pricing benefits claimed by 
efficiently allocating the resources (road capacity) are partially predicted and some effects are 
not included. It was found that the implementation of road pricing minimising total travel 
time (UO) may make society worse off by imposing a greater total social cost than the non-
interventional traffic (UE). This means that a form of road charging which excludes social 
costs may create negative social benefits for society.  
 
There is a dilemma in that these assignments (the UE, UO and SO assignments) have their 
own advantages and disadvantages. The UE has near-optimal social cost and largest total 
travel time. The UO has minimum total travel time but a high level of social cost, whilst the 
SO minimises the social cost and causes more total travel time than the UO. Nevertheless, the 
SO is based on the monetary evaluation of all major costs and if this evaluation is sound, it 
delivers the best answer to maximising economic benefits and minimising the adverse impacts 
of transportation. The SO calls for social road pricing minimising the total social cost, rather 
than road pricing to minimise the travel time. 
 
As for future studies, efforts should be made to allow for elastic demand. If the cost of travel 
is to be increased, the aim would not be to simply change the distribution of traffic on a 
network, but to reduce the amount of travel. 
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